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INVITED ARTICLE
Look at Mother Nature on the Run in the 21st
Century: Responsibility, Research and Innovation
Robert G. Lee*
Abstract
There is growing interest in a framework for responsible research and innovation within
Europe. This paper explores why this has come about and suggests that it is related to
a concern with emerging and converging technologies that goes beyond a narrow conception
of risk to the environment or to human health. Rather, there is a trepidation arising out of the
transformative capacity of modern technologies and their stated aspiration to manipulate the
natural world. In this context, the paper poses three central questions about the shape of any
framework for responsible research and innovation. First, why is the target that of research
and innovation? Secondly, at what scale should the framework operate? Thirdly, what form
of governance structure would be best suited to the oversight of research and innovation?
Keywords:Technologies, Responsibility, Innovation, Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Risk,
Regulation, Governance
1. introduction
Gravitation, Einstein said, cannot be held responsible for people falling in love.1 But
what precisely is the ambit of scientiﬁc responsibility for changes no less profound
in the world in which we live? On 16 and 17 May 2011 in Brussels, Belgium, the
European Commission, in the form of its Directorate General Research,2 held
a workshop to consider a ‘Responsible Research and Innovation Framework for the
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The title of this paper derives from Neil Young’s song ‘After the Gold Rush’ which, in contemporary
form, includes the reference to the 21st century. I am grateful to Elen Stokes and Steven Vaughan for their
comments on an earlier draft and Felicity Powell for her help in organizing the paper.
1 H. Dukas & B. Hoffmann (eds.), Einstein: The Human Side (Princeton University Press, 1981), at p. 56.
2 The administrative branch of the European Commission consists of 40 Directorates General (DGs),
which are equivalent to ministries at the national level and service the different policy areas for which the
Commission has responsibility, including DG Environment, DG Internal Market, and DG Research: see
D. Chalmers, European Union Law (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, 2010), at pp. 57–8.
European Research Area’3 and announced various soft law initiatives to promote
responsible research and innovation (RRI). The tag of RRI is in some ways curious. Has
research and innovation been irresponsible to date? And, if so, how? Also, the linking
of responsibility to innovation might seem to suggest that innovation is the responsible
response to problems, so that activities such as geo-engineering become legitimate in
the face of climate change. In contrast, responsibility in the context of sustainable
development might lie in foregoing the opportunities allowed to us by innovation.
Responsibility will need to allow for a maturity of choice in which some possibilities
are closed off as others are opened up.4
At least one review of responsibility has been established in the context
of a commitment to develop nanotechnology, while looking to minimize adverse effects
or unintended consequences of that development.5 Such approaches have been criticized
as deploying responsibility as the ‘balancing calculus’ between the perceived beneﬁts
of innovation and the risks to which it might give rise.6 This is suggestive of supporting
a utilitarian endeavour, whereas more deontological approaches7 might indicate that
there are certain things that we should not do, even though we can.8 A single framework
for both research and innovation may also prove problematic. Research may be seen as
advancing knowledge whereas technological innovation is concerned with application,
often of different sets of knowledge.9 It may be difﬁcult to frame responsibilities for
research when applications of research ﬁndings may be diverse and manifold. So, the
idea of RRI is not unproblematic. Nonetheless, the pursuit by the European Union (EU)
of a soft law framework for RRI is remarkable and ambitious. In this paper, I wish to
explore three central questions relating to this initiative: those of objective (why research
and innovation?), scale (why the EU?), and governance (why soft law?)
2. objective
The debate about responsibility in relation to innovation is ignited by the trans-
formative power of science, particularly through converging technologies: the ability
3 European Commission, ‘DG Research Workshop on Responsible Research & Innovation in Europe’,
16–17 May 2011, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/
responsible-research-and-innovation-workshop-newsletter_en.pdf.
4 See R. Williams, Lost Icons: Reﬂections on Cultural Bereavement (T & T Clark, 2000), Ch. 1.
5 See National Research Council, Committee to Review the National Nanotechnology Initiative,AMatter
of Size: Triennial Review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (National Academies Press, 2006),
Ch. 4.
6 M. Kearnes & A. Rip, ‘The Emerging Governance Landscape of Nanotechnology’, in S. Gammel et al.
(eds.), Jenseits von Regulierung: Zum politischen Umgang mit der Nanotechnologie (AKA Verlag,
2009), pp. 97–121.
7 Though my colleague, Chris Groves, would argue that both utilitarian and deontological approaches
become problematic when obligations to the future are at stake: see C. Groves, ‘Future Ethics: Risk, Care
and Non-Reciprocal Responsibility’ (2009) 5(1) Journal of Global Ethics, pp. 17–31.
8 This might reﬂect the notion of dignity to complete Brownsword’s triangular analysis on modern
technologies based on utility, deontology and dignity: see R. Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the
Technological Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2008).
9 C. Lyall and J. Tait, ‘Foresight in a Multi-level Governance Structure: Policy Integration and
Communication’ (2004) 31(1) Science and Public Policy, pp. 27–37.
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of different systems to join in a common endeavour. There is a ‘constellation of
modern technologies’10 (including biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, information,
and cognition technologies) that involve the manipulation of both biological and
non-biological materials and, thus, blur the borders not only of scientiﬁc disciplines
but also of what might constitute life – the difference, say, between a brain and
a computer. There is something radically different not only in the transformative
capacity of such technologies but also in their aspiration. The goals of these technologies
includemanipulation of atomicmatter, of genes, and of the earth’s climate. Their remit is
sweeping and breathtaking and it relates not only to biomedical interventions at the
beginning or end of life, but also to the environment in which, and human conditions11
under which, we live that life. While nature is inevitably interpreted and technically
constructed through science, it is now also shaped by its deliberate intrusion.
Add to this the ubiquity of modern technology and the magnitude of its impact.
Nanoscience, for example, does not generate a technology of single application. Rather,
the engineering of functioning systems at the nanoscale produces a general purpose,
enabling technology capable of countless applications in many different ﬁelds. Whereas
the regulation of technologies given over to a single purpose might be amenable to
regulatory oversight by a single agency, this sort of solution is foreclosed by the
pervasive nature of nanotechnologies. Moreover, not only do the technologies set out
to modify physical processes but they also do so on an industrial basis. This has led to
Krohn and Weyer suggesting that society may be used as a laboratory in instances
where, to take their example, the impact of the release of genetically modiﬁed organisms
(GMOs) into the environment is only ﬁnally determined by trying it out. They suggest that,
as society at large is exposed to the dangers of scientiﬁc error in such circumstances, ‘this
requires a redistribution of responsibility’.12
If we place the emphasis here on responsibility, the notion of RRI is evocative of
a concern that modernization or innovation can be morally problematic. It could
indicate that doubts about scientiﬁc progress are no longer conﬁned to the ﬁeld of
technological application, but are increasingly raised at the stage of research. The call is
for ethical choice to become embedded in procedures and processes which attach to the
research itself to allow a determination of ‘what types of decision may be made,
how they may be made, by whom, and with the assistance of what resources’.13 This
represents a move towards the institutionalization of decision-making and is well
represented by recent moves of the United Kingdom (UK) Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) to demand this type of foresight at the grant
10 Brownsword, n. 8 above.
11 Although in an environmental journal I am placing an emphasis on the impact on the natural world, this
is not to ignore issues such as privacy, human dignity and autonomy reviewed and seen to be under threat
in n. 8 above.
12 W. Krohn & J. Weyer, ‘Society as a Laboratory: Social Risks of Experimental Research’ (1994) 21(3)
Science and Public Policy, pp. 173–83.
13 B. Jennings, ‘Possibilities of Consensus: Toward Democratic Moral Discourse’ (1991) 16 Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy, pp. 447–63, at 452.
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application stage as it did with the third nanotechnology grand challenge on climate
change.14 This is a fascinating development since research grant income is generally
generated by an appeal to future worth, whereas the EPSRC now demands the
completion of a risk register to catalogue potential downsides. This is a seismic shift
from earlier science-driven models of innovation. The focus on societal, environmental
and economic outcomes of research and development in this context might be seen
alongside calls for demonstration of the ‘impact’ of research undertaken. In other
words, the return on the investment in science is open to scrutiny.
It goes beyond this, however, because the concern that generates the call for RRI is
a product of our enhanced awareness of the power of modern science, which leads to
two strands of thinking: one about risk and the other about responsibility. In relation
to risk, we have heeded Beck’s caution, ﬁrst written 25 years ago, about the
unregulated, and therefore uncontrolled, development of science and technology.15
The exponential capacity of scientiﬁc research to prise open possibility makes more
formal modes of control practically impossible. This capacity, well represented by
Moore’s Law,16 also makes it likely that even feasible controls will be resisted in favour
of seemingly benign promises or the appeal of possibility. Beck spoke of the changing
relationship of ‘humankind to itself’ and the blurring boundaries between the natural
and the man-made under such forces. The notion of ‘risk’ in risk society is wider then
than hazard and becomes, as Giddens has observed, a preoccupationwith a diversity of
possible futures, which we explore in an effort to normalize and control.17
Risk society, understood in this way, is intertwined with the increasing inﬂuence
of science and technology and its capacity to manufacture risk. No longer an
unambiguous source of discovery, scientiﬁc research is seen as generating rather than
negating uncertainties, the resolution of which cannot be found simply in scientiﬁc
evidence.18 Indeed the fear is not, or not only, one of anticipated untoward consequences
of innovation but (also) of the unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences. While, then,
greater attention is given to the environmental and human health consequences of
technological development,19 given the uncertainty and knowledge shortfalls that are
emerging, this development is outstripped by the rapidly growing need for anticipatory
14 R. Owen &N. Goldberg, ‘Responsible Innovation: A Pilot Study with the UK Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council’ (2010) 30(11) Journal of Risk Analysis, pp. 1699–707.
15 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage, 1992) translated from the German original:
U. Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Suhrkamp, 1986).
16 G.E.Moore, ‘CrammingMoreComponents onto IntegratedCircuits’ (1965) 38(8)Electronics, pp. 114–7.
Moore predicted that for the immediate future ‘the number of transistors incorporated in a chip will
approximately double every 24 months’, at p. 117.
17 A. Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62(1)Modern Law Review, pp. 1–10.
18 J.S. Applegate, ‘Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for Chemical Information’
(2007) 86(7) Texas Law Review pp. 1365–407.
19 See the approach of the European Chemicals Agency to Socio Economic Analysis under REACH
(Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals, Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006, [2006] OJ
L396/1), which has a strong focus on questions of the protection of the environment and of human
health, ranked against the economic consequences of decisions to restrict chemicals but which, in spite of
the label, has hardly anything ‘socio’ in the mechanism: ECHA (2008) ‘Guidance on Socio Economic
Analysis – Restrictions’, European Chemicals Agency, May 2008, available at: http://echa.europa.
eu/documents/10162/17233/sea_restrictions_en.pdf.
108 Transnational Environmental Law, 1:1 (2012), pp. 105–117
governance, which includes participatory debate on the sorts of future that innovations
may herald. At this point, questions of risk begin to shade into those of responsibility.
Hans Jonas – coming from a different direction from Beck, but also writing in the
mid-1980s and in an analysis no less compelling – is concerned with the power of
technology to penetrate the boundaries of nature to the point that this generates
a responsibility that both correlates with that power and is commensurate with it.20 In
other words, it is the scope of the enterprise in the exercise of this power that shapes the
nature of the responsibility. Though not one of Jonas’ examples, one might say that if
synthetic biology seeks to produce tools to redesign the natural world, then it is this
very ambition and aspiration that engender and structure the degree of accountability.
This is an extensive – perhaps all-embracing – and, for Jonas,metaphysical responsibility
in so far as it extends beyond a single generation or species. For Jonas, the identiﬁcation
of this responsibility is crucial in discriminating between ‘legitimate and illegitimate goal
settings to our Promethean power’.21 This suggests a scientiﬁc futurology, a ‘lengthened
foresight’, which may lead to self-denial of opportunity, and the preservation of values
and traditions at the expense of other potentiality.
We are accustomed to viewing responsibility as a moral foundation of legal
relationships between citizens under Kantian inﬂuence.22 The norms that shape our
morality rest on the status of individuals, who should be treated as ends and not means.
Arguably, placing future generations in jeopardy or depleting resources on which they
would otherwise depend may be to treat such generations as a means to satisfy present
desires. However, as Groves has pointed out,23 such moral imperatives become much
more difﬁcult to apply where the citizens in question do not live in spatial and temporal
proximity to each other. We therefore lose some of the guidance of moral philosophy
in seeking to make determinations about what might be considered ‘responsible’
in relation to future technology. Added to the difﬁculties of time and space are the
limitations on foresight, especially in relation to the unidentiﬁed and ambiguous. This
is notmerely amatter of the limits of scientiﬁc knowledge, or the existence of a territory
of the yet undiscovered lying outside the boundaries of present scientiﬁc understandings.
Technologies transport24 such knowledge25 into a huge variety of social settings and
practices.26 It is our ignorance and the impossibility of knowing about these that pose the
20 H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (University of Chicago Press, 1984), at p. ix.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., at pp. 4–12.
23 Groves, n. 7 above.
24 Heidegger would put it muchmore strongly than this, arguing that technology does not follow science in
the form of an application of scientiﬁc knowledge but sets the very agenda and mind-set of modern
science through its ‘enframing’ capacity: see M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays (Harper, 1977) (edition in translation).
25 Somewould contest this depiction of technology as producing the concrete results of scientiﬁc knowledge
not least because it seems to assert the neutrality of science: see D. Agazzi, ‘From Technique to
Technology: The Role of Modern Science’ (1998) 4(2) Philosophy and Technology, pp. 1–9.
26 R. Sandler, ‘Nanotechnology and Social Context’ (2007) 27(6) Bulletin of Science, Technology &
Society, pp. 446–54.
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real challenge. This constitutes the reﬂexive element of modernization27 and its presence
produces a need to act responsibly but in conditions of true uncertainty of eventualities.
What then of decision-making in favour of responsible innovation under conditions of
ignorance and uncertainty?
One rather obvious point is that if such conditions of contingency pertain, then
there can be no guarantee that the responsibility will eliminate the risk. However, if
we accept, as suggested by Jonas, that there is a correlation between the power of
technology and the responsibility for it, then this does begin to suggest collective
responsibility on those seeking to share in the technological offerings. The collectivism is
highlighted by Jonas,28 who offers a moral imperative that stresses the weight of
the responsibility. This is that the existence and essence of humankind should never be
made a stake in the hazards of action. Shared responsibility suggests an opening up of the
decision-making processes beyond expert determination to allow the expression of many
voices and values about what sort of world we would have and people we would be.
This section of the paper has suggested that the power and scope of modern
technologies infringe upon the natural world in such a way that there is a commen-
surate responsibility in the deployment of the technology. This is not (only) to do
with risk as narrowly deﬁned in terms of hazard, but is more to do with the type of
future that we might endow. It has been suggested that RRI can never be truly
responsible until full account is taken of the social context in which technologies will
operate.29 If this is so, responsibility needs to be shared widely in processes of upstream
engagement and in settings that go beyond expert groups.30 Beyleveld and Brownsword
have depicted a ‘community of rights’, which engages in a continuously reﬂective
process on the best interpretations of its commitments.31 Responsibility sharing offers
no guarantee of a safe or salubrious future but it may negate extreme opposition to
innovation.Meanwhile, the processmay enhance anticipatory governance by conferring
greater legitimacy. Since the turn of themillennium, there has already been amarked rise
in the governance focus on economic and societal outcomes together with a greater
preparedness for new technologies. This is explored below, but ﬁrst it is necessary to
consider at what scale such governance might be pursued.
3. scale
Science policy has traditionally been a matter for nation states, albeit at times in
liaison with international organizations.32 This pattern is changing. There is much
27 Beck, Risk Society, n. 15 above.
28 Jonas, n. 20 above.
29 Sandler, n. 26 above.
30 J. Wilsdon & R. Willis, See-Through Science: Why Public Engagement Needs to Move Upstream
(DEMOS, 2004).
31 D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, ‘Proceduralism and Precaution in a Community of Rights’ (2006)
19(2) Ratio Juris pp. 141–68.
32 P. Laredo & P. Mustar (eds.), ‘General Introduction’, in Research and Innovation Policies in the
New Global Economy (Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 2–4.
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more supranational collaboration such as that pursued by the EU Research Frame-
work Programmes. At the same time, signiﬁcant attention is given to the regenerative
capacity of science and technology, creating strong regional interest33 in the impor-
tance of knowledge and knowledge spillover for economic development.34 Because
disruptive technologies break through traditional disciplinary boundaries and call
for fresh alliances, they may be seen as opening up opportunities for new clusters
of research and development activity. Supranational and regional initiatives may be
related: EU science policy stresses the contribution of regions of Europe in mobilizing
research and development.35
As science policy is expanding beyond and within the realm of the nation state,
governance too will follow this trend. Converging technologies can give rise to
a range of goods, infrastructure, and even services. The end product of technological
development will inﬂuence the scale on which it might be regulated. For example,
nanoscience has already given rise to a wide variety of products in a range of market
sectors. The Woodrow Wilson Institute lists over 1,000 products which it has assessed
as employing nanotechnological innovation.36 These are not necessarily whole products
but can include product components such as coatings for cars and clothing. There
is strong representation of nanomaterials in the sectors of medicines, cosmetics,
(agro)chemicals, and electronics, which were early starters in the ﬁeld.37
The propensity of such products to cross borders, not merely within Europe but
on a global basis, poses the greatest challenge for their regulation.38 In the absence of
internationally agreed product standards, which is the present case with nano-
materials, restrictions on market circulation are usually justiﬁed by reference to risk
assessment (risk, here, being narrowly deﬁned by reference to hazards to human
health). TheWTO Biotech Products dispute39 suggests that there may be little room for
democratic self-determination when it is in seeming conﬂict with trade liberalization
and even less acceptance that scientiﬁc risk assessment might be other than a policy or
value-neutral process that will produce sound scientiﬁc decisions40 to which we can
33 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Science & the RDAs: SETting the
Regional Agenda (The Stationery Ofﬁce Ltd, 2003).
34 L. Leydesdorff & M. Meyer, ‘The Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations’ (2004)
58(2) Scientometrics, pp. 191–203.
35 European Commission, ‘The Regional Dimension of the European Research Area Communication from
the Commission’, COM(2001)549 ﬁnal; but see R. Kaiser & H. Prange, ‘Missing the Lisbon Target?
Multilevel Innovation and EU Policy Coordination’ (2005) 25(2) Journal of Public Policy, pp. 241–63.
36 Woodrow Wilson Institute, ‘Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies’, available at:
http://www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer.
37 L. Theodore & R.G. Kunz, Nanotechnology: Environmental Implications and Solutions (Wiley-
Interscience, 2005).
38 G.H. Reynolds, ‘Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures’ (2003) 17 Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology, pp. 179–209.
39 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291 (US), WT/DS292 (Canada), and WT/DS291 (Argentina), Panel Report of 29 Sept. 2006,
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm.
40 D. Winickoff, S. Jasanoff, R. Grove-White, L. Busch & B. Wynne, ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars:
Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law’ (2005) 30(1) Yale Journal of International Law,
pp. 81–123.
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adhere. The world trade battleground for nanotechnology might be mandatory
labelling requirements, which are actively being considered by the European Parlia-
ment as a means to inform consumers of the presence of nanomaterials, but which may
constitute a technical barrier to trade.41 The EU and the United States (US) are already
pursuing divergent policies in relation to consumer labelling,42 with real practical
impact on importers in areas such as cosmetics.43
Where technological innovation gives rise to infrastructure, one might anticipate
that the location of the infrastructure will determine the point of regulation. For the
most part this is so, though the location of that infrastructure may be hotly contested
and the development itself might be resisted. However, because of the transboundary
impacts of the infrastructure, there may be international agreements on operational
issues and potential liabilities. The nuclear sector is a good example of this.44
Concluding such agreements may be a slow and difﬁcult process, but economic and
environmental imperatives can drive agreement forward, as has been the case with
carbon capture and storage.45 Again, the EU provides an illustration of how supra-
national regulation may manage such development through harmonized processes of
environmental impact assessment, even though ongoing supervision may be national
or entail devolved responsibility, and even though the process involves continual
readjustment of divergent approaches.
Technological innovation may give rise to service provision: cloud computing
offers an excellent example of the move from product to service. In the case of cloud
computing, the location of the infrastructure on which the service depends may be
unknown to the end user though the service provision itself might be expected to be
governed by national law. Innovations in biomedicine tend to be delivered as
individualized services. In the case of reproductive technologies, national regulation,
often driven from an ethical standpoint, might seem almost otiose because of the
possibility of what Knoppers and LeBris have labelled ‘procreative tourism’.46 Many
states may not regulate for the advance determination of what should be permitted
either through inability to reach a moral consensus or through an attachment to
41 United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384, Panel Report
of 18 Nov. 2011), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds384_e.htm.
42 R. Falkner, L. Breggin, N. Jaspers, J. Pendergrass & R. Porter, Consumer Labelling of Nanomaterials in
the EU and US: Convergence or Divergence? EERG Brieﬁng Paper 2009/03, Chatham House, Oct.
2009, available at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109136.
43 Labelling is now required in the EU, see Regulation (EC) No. 1223/2009 on Cosmetic Products [2009]
OJ L342/59.
44 See the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, Vienna (Austria), 21 May 1963, in force 12 Nov. 1977, available at: http://www.iaea.
org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability.html; and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, Paris (France), 29 July 1960, in force 1 Apr. 1968, available at http://www.oecd-nea.
org/law/nlparis_conv.html.
45 Where the desire to continue to exploit hydrocarbon fuel has led to rapid transitions in the international
law framework for sub-seabed storage, see R.G. Lee, ‘Sub-seabed Carbon Sequestration: Building the
Legal Platform’ (2009) 30 Liverpool Law Review, pp. 131–46.
46 B. Knoppers & S. LeBris, ‘Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social
Issues’ (1991) 17 American Journal of Law & Medicine, pp. 329–61, at 333.
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unhinderedmarket provision of medical services. Even if one pursued concerted efforts
to harmonize or approximate the law of individual states,47 one might agree on the
general principles (such as the inviolability of the human person) only to have such
agreement unravel in discussions of what is meant by personhood.48 Because of this, it
has been suggested that procreative tourism forms an effective solution to the regu-
latory problem as well as one that leaves room for moral pluralism.49 Note, however,
that because of the notion of freedom of services, ethical determinations seemingly
resolved at the national level with regard to access to biomedicine may suddenly
become subject to scrutiny under supranational law. This happened in the case of Diane
Blood,50 who was allowed to travel to Belgium for assisted conception services, with the
unlawfully obtained sperm of her dead husband, when the UK Court of Appeal
employed ‘the trump of EU law to sweep aside the hand dealt by the UK Parliament’.51
Finally, note that some technologies may produce hybrids that are neither purely
goods nor services. Biotechnology in relation to GMO crops offers a good example.
The seeds are a classic economic good. However, their repeated provision to the
farmer, when combined with the instrumental purpose inherent in genetic modiﬁ-
cation, takes on the form of a service. Moreover, once planted, the resultant crops
form part of the landscape and local environment in the manner of an infrastructure
project. The Biotech Products dispute and its aftermath are instructive.52 The dispute
resulted from a de facto moratorium on processing applications for imports of GMOs
into the EU. The moratorium was adopted as a result of Member State resistance to
GMOs. But since the European Commission itself had never supported the moratorium
but rather condoned it to placate the Member States, it was unable to muster a robust
defence when the moratorium was being challenged before a WTO dispute panel –
instead, it denied the very existence of a moratorium. It might be thought that theWTO
Panel ﬁnding against the EUwouldwhip the recalcitrant states into line, instead of which
the European Parliament voted in July 2011 to give them greater freedom. Under
the European Commission proposal,53 the European-wide authorization system would
47 As has happened with the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology andMedicine (Oviedo Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine), Oviedo (Spain), 4 Apr. 1997, in force 1 Dec. 1999, available at:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm, which to date has received just ﬁve ratiﬁca-
tions. For the problems, see M. Mori & D. Neri, ‘Perils and Deﬁciencies of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine’ (2001) 26 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, pp. 323–33.
48 For this sort of difﬁculty see the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights in A, B, and C v. Ireland, Appl. No. 25579/2005, 16 Dec. 2010, available at:
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/2010/echr/index.pdf.
49 G. Pennings, ‘Reproductive Tourism asMoral Pluralism inMotion’ (2002) 28 Journal ofMedical Ethics,
pp. 337–41.
50 R v. HFEA, ex parte Diane Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687 (CA).
51 D.Morgan&R.G. Lee, ‘In theName of the Father? Ex parte Blood: Dealing withNovelty and Anomaly’
(1997) 60Modern Law Review, pp. 840–56; and see T. Hervey, ‘Buy Baby: The European Union and
Regulation of Human Reproduction’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 207–33.
52 See n. 39 above.
53 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the
Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in their Territory,
COM(2010)375 ﬁnal, 13 July 2010, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/docs/
proposal_en.pdf.
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remain but it would be open to Member States to cite, inter alia, agricultural and
environmental effects and their potential socio-economic impact to justify a ban or
restriction on GMO cultivation. It will be interesting to see if devolved administrations
withinMember States will look to exploit such an opportunity (as Wales would wish to
do within the UK)54 in a move that is in line with the growing possibilities of autono-
mous regions within Europe exercising differing policy choices.55
In all of these examples I am trying to demonstrate, from experience, the difﬁculty
of centring the regulation of technologies at any particular scale. Certainly, controls
at the level of the nation state look increasingly problematic, though they may serve an
important declamatory purpose in terms of what is considered tolerable. Even regula-
tory attempts at the supranational level, as within the EU, may fall foul of international
agreements. Moreover, with some technologies (such as geo-engineering) international
agreement could prove vital. At the other end of the scale, more local, bottom-up
determinations of the choices offered by science and technology might support
sustainable development, yet under the forces of economic liberalization it is unlikely that
such choices can fully determine the conditions formarkets in goods and services resulting
from innovation. However, as the GMO experience shows, the realm of the local cannot
be ignored if a market is to develop. All of this suggests that a complex, multilevel
governance of science and technology will be required if RRI is to oversee the shift of
locally based, single discipline scientiﬁc research into global multi-disciplinary techno-
logical innovations.56 The question, according to the European Commission, is not
whether to deal with ‘challenges posed by new knowledge and its applications’, but how
to do so.57
4. governance
Science and technology have long been subject to regulation. The desire to regulate
may be driven by wide-ranging motivations, but these generally concern fears of
market failure. One obvious concern is that certain technological innovations might
generate externalities, in the form of social or environmental costs that may not be
internalized in the pricing of any eventual product generated by the technology.
There may be other factors, too, for which the market ﬁnds it difﬁcult to account,
such as ethical concerns generated by the application of technology. In such instances
law may be seen to state the limits of scientiﬁc research, though this has been the
subject of hostile reactions in the past on the part of the scientiﬁc community. One
54 TheWelsh Government ‘takes the most restrictive stance possible to GeneticallyModiﬁed (GM) crops
that is consistent with European and UK law’: see Welsh Government, ‘Genetically Modiﬁed
Organisms’, available at: http://wales.gov.uk/topics/environmentcountryside/farmingandcountryside/
plantsseedsbiotechnology/geneticallymodiﬁedorganisms/?lang5en.
55 J. Hunt, ‘Devolution and Differentiation: Regional Variation in EU Law’ (2010) 30(3) Legal Studies,
pp. 421–41.
56 D. Jacobs, ‘Innovation Policies within the Framework of Internationalization’ (1998) 27(7) Research
Policy, pp. 711–24.
57 EuropeanCommission, ‘Life Sciences and Biotechnology –A Strategy for Europe’, COM (2002) 27 ﬁnal,
23 Jan. 2002, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/biotechnology/pdf/com2002-27_en.pdf.
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example of this hostile reaction might be the reaction to the Warnock proposals
in 1984,58 which sought to place limits and controls on embryology in the UK.
Interestingly, the eventual resolution of the perceived need for intervention
was a command and control solution. The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act 1990 introduced controls through licensing and gave rise to a regulatory agency,
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which the present
government appears to regard as a quango that is no longer affordable. Plans to wind
down the HFEA were met with dismay by the same scientiﬁc community that had
once opposed the very idea of such a body. The HFEA was seen as fulﬁlling an
important role in negotiating the boundaries of embryo research and assisted
conception. In a telling comment, two senior gynaecologists suggested that ‘when these
researchers must deal with a broader range of opinions about whether their research
should be done, they are likely to regret the loss of a specialist regulator’.59
Sceptics might cite this as an excellent example of regulatory capture in which the
body created to regulate grows so close to the regulated sector that it becomes seen as
friend and not foe. But this might equally be seen as a success in working down the
Ayres and Braithwaite regulatory pyramid,60 so that formal enforcement has given
way to successful, consensual processes of compliance. The winding down of the HFEA
will not necessarily bring an end to licensing, but it does suggest that the command and
control structures are seen as overly bureaucratic, expensive and burdensome, and that
future modes of scientiﬁc regulation will take a rather different form. It is worth
dwelling on why this might be so.
The turn from regulation to governance involves less top-down government and
greater involvement of a wide range of stakeholders to achieve the desired ends,
described as a move from ‘power over’ to granting ‘power to’ such stakeholders.61
Such a model might be seen as better able to serve as a platform for more deliberative
models of public engagement than have been discussed thus far.62 Ironically, however,
governance arrangements are the product of top-down modiﬁcations of the role of
government in the late twentieth century whereby, rather than performing a provi-
dential, welfarist role, government is seen as a source of social intrusion and economic
inefﬁciency.63 In their replacement of nation states, market states are seen, in contrast,
as enhancing choice, with choice becoming a source of authority in its own right.64 The
danger is, however, that technology can displace true rationality, as well as choices
58 M. Warnock (Chair), Report of a Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology
(Cmnd. 9314, HMSO, 1984).
59 J. Parsons & M. Savvas, ‘Why We Shouldn’t Abolish the HFEA’, BioNews, 4 Oct. 2010, available at:
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_71776.asp.
60 I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford
University Press, 1992).
61 J. Pierre & G.B. Peters, Governance Politics and the State (Macmillan, 2000).
62 J. Walls, T. Horlick-Jones, J. Niewöhner & T. O’Riordan, ‘The Meta-Governance of Risk and New
Technologies: GM Crops and Mobile Telephones’ (2005) 8 Journal of Risk Research, pp. 635–61.
63 T. Judt, Reappraisals: Reﬂections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (Heinemann, 2008), at p. 8.
64 P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles (Penguin, 2002).
Robert G. Lee 115
in favour of human rights and dignity, and replace this with techno-regulation that
binds individuals to a code from which there is little or no opting out.65
Notwithstanding such concerns, there may be few options but to invest in soft
law modes of governance for a wide number of reasons. One is simply a matter of
regulatory capacity for, as Stokes has observed, ‘the greater the role of private actors
in the administration of regulatory measures, the lower the costs of acquiring
information and reducing information deﬁcits’.66 A second issue of capacity is that more
formal command and control regulation, coming as it does with criminal sanctions,
depends on certainty in deﬁnition or metrics that may not yet be readily deliverable.67
Soft lawmay be awiser response to complex and diverse problems that are characterized
by uncertainty, perhaps preceding hard law responses while leaving room for ﬂexibility
and responding to unintended consequences.68 This is partly because of the mismatch of
timescales between innovation and regulation69 which suggest that, however soft the
‘law’, it may be preferable to a vacuumpending hard lawmeasures. Vogel has suggested,
however, that these private regulatory models must eventually be integrated into and
reinforced by regulatory enforcement at an appropriate level.70
There may also be a link between governance and scale. For example, the prospect
of reaching international agreement in areas such as environmental law would appear
to grow ever more difﬁcult as its substance becomes entwined with areas such as
development and trade liberalization. Hard choices might be more easily faced with
soft law.71 Soft law instruments in this context may take the form of standard setting
rather than treaties. Equally, corporate social responsibility (CSR) may generate
voluntary subscriptions to codes of conduct, which might be (for example) local
to a ﬁrm, nationally or transnationally sector-based, or covering a cross-section of
industry within or across national jurisdictions. Supranational regulation may trigger
global responses in what Heyvaert has described as a regulatory game of winners and
losers;72 soft law approaches are likely to be less prone to retaliatory action.
There is a relationship too between objective and governance. If deliberative,
upstream processes are seen as part of the delivery mechanisms of responsibility,
65 Brownsword, n. 8 above, at p. 242; and L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999).
66 E. Stokes, ‘RegulatingNanotechnologies: Sizing up the Options’ (2009) 29(2)Legal Studies, pp. 281–304.
67 L. Frater, E. Stokes, R. Lee&T.Oriola,AnOverview of the Framework of Current RegulationAffecting
the Development and Marketing of Nanomaterials (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2006).
68 U. Mörth, Soft Law in Governance and Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2004).
69 With law ‘in the rear and limping a little’, seeMount IsaMines v. Pusey [1970] 125CLR383 (Windeyer J).
70 D. Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct’, in W. Mattli & N. Woods (eds.), The
Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 151–88; and hard law and soft law
ought not to be seen as in opposition but rather can meld into hybrid structures: see V. Heyvaert,
‘Levelling Down, Levelling Up, and Governing Across: Three Responses to Hybridization in International
Law’ (2009) 20(3) European Journal of International Law, pp. 647–74.
71 J.J. Kirton & M.J. Trebilcock, ‘Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global
Governance’, in J.J. Kirton & M.J. Trebilcock (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in
Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Ashgate, 2004), pp. 3–29.
72 V. Heyvaert, ‘Globalizing Regulation: Reaching Beyond the Borders of Chemical Safety’ (2009) 36(1)
Journal of Law and Society, pp. 110–28.
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these are more likely to give rise to soft law instruments such as codes, voluntary
agreements, action plans, resolutions, statements, certiﬁcation schemes, standards
and strategies. Responsibility itself suggests voluntary assumption rather than
enforced action – soft rather than hard law approaches. The assumption of shared
responsibility commensurate with the aspirations of many converging technologies
suggests engagement outside of the democratic sphere of legislative action in more
decentralized social settings: the sphere of soft rather than hard law. This is challenging
and, to some degree, concerning to those whomight fear the displacement of the rule of
law by rule of technology.73
5. conclusion
Mapping out the contours of a responsible research and innovation framework is
likely to be a protracted and problematic assignment. This paper tries to offer an
overview of the terrain. It is rugged and somewhat indistinct, yet its silhouette is
there. The objective of the framework must be to address broad societal concerns that
stretch well beyond simple notions of hazard to include wider contingency and
doubts about the very direction of some technologies, stirred by our awareness of
their transformative capacities. The framework must be not only participatory but
also anticipatory. It cannot be conﬁned to balancing beneﬁt against risk because it
must concern itself not just with material wealth but with moral health.
We are all charged with this task, but the questions of the appropriate scale on
which to pursue it are complex and the answers may vary in accordance with the
innovations engaged. Because we can be sure that there is no single territory in which
we can confront the challenges of ordering our technological futures, the exercise will
be one of multilevel governance. This is because the task outstrips the remit of
governments, certainly individually but probably even when they seek to act in
concert. Partly as a consequence, soft law instruments must play a part but we need
to ensure that they are the product of the upstream, inclusive engagement that forms
the spine of responsibility. Soft law instruments are not in opposition to hard law
variants, which may prove necessary with time. Great care must be taken that the use
of soft law is institutionalized into research and development practices but that these
mechanisms, as a result, do not become subject to capture. ‘Soft’ cannot mean
‘yielding’ if we are to leave room to rein in some of the potential of innovation, rather
than have it reign over us.
73 Brownsword, n. 8 above, at pp. 1–6.
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